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One-time programs, computer programs which self-destruct after being run only once, are a powerful building
block in cryptography and would allow for new forms of secure software distribution. However, ideal one-time
programs have been proved to be unachievable using either classical or quantum resources. Here we relax
the definition of one-time programs to allow some probability of error in the output and show that quantum
mechanics offers security advantages over purely classical resources. We introduce a scheme for encoding
probabilistic one-time programs as quantum states with prescribed measurement settings, explore their security,
and experimentally demonstrate various one-time programs using measurements on single-photon states. These
include classical logic gates, a program to solve Yao’s millionaires problem, and a one-time delegation of a
digital signature. By combining quantum and classical technology, we demonstrate that quantum techniques
can enhance computing capabilities even before full-scale quantum computers are available.
With the continuous march of technological advancement,
computer processors have become ubiquitous, impacting al-
most every aspect of our daily lives. Whether being used to
compose email or acting as control systems for industrial ap-
plications, these devices rely on specially written software to
ensure their correct operation. In many cases it would be de-
sirable to prevent a program from being duplicated or to con-
trol the number of times a program could be executed, for ex-
ample to prevent reverse-engineering or to ensure compliance
with licensing restrictions. Unfortunately, the very nature of
classical information ensures that software can in principle al-
ways be copied and rerun, enabling various misuses.
As a solution to this and other problems the concept of one-
time programs was introduced [1]. One-time programs are
a computational paradigm that allows for functions that can
be executed one time and one time only. Thus, if a software
vendor encodes a function f as a one-time program, a user
having only one copy of that program can obtain only one
input-output pair (x, f(x)) before the program becomes inop-
erable. In the classical world, this is only possible through the
use of one-time hardware or one-time memories [1], special-
purpose hardware that gets physically destroyed after being
used once. However, it is unclear whether such hardware can
be realised in an absolutely secure way. An adversary may
attack the specific implementation, seeking to circumvent or
reverse whatever physical process is used to disable the device
after a single use.
Certain features of quantum mechanics, such as the no-
cloning theorem [2, 3] and the irreversibility of measurements
[4], suggest that it may enable a solution to this problem.
It was recently shown, however, that deterministic one-time
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programs are impossible even in the quantum regime [5].
As a result, it is believed that neither classical nor quantum
information-theoretically secure one-time programs are pos-
sible [1, 5–9] without further assumptions [10–14].
Here, we demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that
quantum mechanics does enable a form of probabilistic one-
time program which shows an advantage over any possible
classical counterpart. These rely on quantum information pro-
cessing to execute, but encode entirely classical computation.
Such probabilistic one-time programs circumvent existing no-
go results by allowing a (bounded) probability of error in the
output of the computation. We show that these quantum one-
time programs offer a trade-off between accuracy and number
of lines of the truth table read, which is not possible in the
classical case. Remarkably, the experimental requirements to
encode the probabilistic one-time programs we introduce are
comparable to those of many quantum key distribution imple-
mentations, allowing for technological advances in that field
to be harnessed for a new application.
Construction
We consider one-time programs (OTPs) in the context of
a two party setting, where Alice is the software provider and
Bob is the user. Alice’s program is represented by a secret
function f , which she encodes as a separable state of some
number of qubits, which scales linearly in the number of el-
ementary logic gates required to implement f , and provides
these to Bob. Bob can then evaluate f on some input of his
choice x by sequentially measuring each qubit received from
Alice. These measurements are a fundamentally irreversible
process, which is necessary for Bob to evaluate f(x) while at
the same time preventing him from learning f(x′) for some
input x′ 6= x. An outline of our approach is presented in
Fig. 1.
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2FIG. 1: Overview of a probabilistic one-time program scheme. Al-
ice possesses a secret program, f, and Bob a secret input, x. Alice
converts f into a logic circuit. Next, Alice encodes the logic gates
comprising the circuit as non-orthogonal quantum states. For the
particular encoding scheme we realise experimentally, these are al-
ways separable states. These states are sent to Bob via a quantum
channel. Bob executes the program by sequentially measuring the
quantum states corresponding to individual logic gates. The basis
for each measurement is determined by Bob’s input to that gate and
the measurement result represents the output of the gate, up to some
bounded probability of error. The encoding can be chosen such that it
suffices for Bob to make only single-qubit measurements. Intuitively,
the security of the scheme stems from the fact that the measurements
corresponding to different inputs for a given gate do not commute,
which prevents Bob from evaluating more than one input.
In analogy to the compiling of standard classical programs,
the logic of f is mapped onto a logic circuit using basic logic
synthesis [15]. It is necessary that the circuits have a cer-
tain standard form, such that the information to be hidden is
encoded in the precise choice of logic gates and not on the
connections between gates. This is because our approach is
to encode the truth table for individual gates as a one-time
program in its own right, which we will call gate one-time
programs (gate-OTPs). The interconnection of gates is left
public, allowing Bob to propagate information from one gate
to the next. Each logic gate is a Boolean function, taking k
input bits and returning a single output bit. We will denote
the set of k-input gates as Gk. For k ≥ 2, it is possible to
implement an arbitrary Boolean function on n input bits with
gates chosen only from Gk together with the fan-out operation
[16] that defines the number of output bits. It is however pos-
sible to build up arbitrary Gk gates from a fixed configuration,
with some choice of gates from G1. Such a construction of an
arbitrary G2 gate is shown in Fig. 2e.
Probabilistic versions of the four gates comprising G1 can
be encoded using a single qubit, as shown in Fig. 2a-d, such
that the measurement operators corresponding to different in-
puts anti-commute. This is achieved by first fixing the mea-
surement bases corresponding to inputs of 0 and 1 respectively
(Fig. 2b), and then finding the states to encode each gate such
that it maximises the average probability of obtaining the cor-
FIG. 2: Method for constructing probabilistic one-time programs for
G1 and G2 gates. All possible truth tables for gates in G1 are shown
in a) while b) shows the encoding of Bob’s inputs: a measurement
in σZ corresponds to an input of 0 to the gate while a measurement
in σX corresponds to an input of 1. The output of the gate is given
by the measurement outcome. c) shows an overview of the four G1
states in a Bloch-Sphere representation. A detailed example is shown
in d): when measured in σZ (i.e. input 0) the state corresponding to
|Ψnot〉 will be found in the state |1〉, corresponding to an output of
1, with a probability of about 85.36%. When measured in σX (i.e.
input 1) the measurement will find |+〉, so an outcome of 0, with the
same probability. e) and f) show the two equivalent circuits to build
an arbitrary G2 gate. e) is based on three G1 gates while the circuit
shown in f) only requires two quantum states per gate, some of which
however need to be outside the X-Z-plane.
rect outcome across both possible inputs (Fig. 2c). The mea-
surement bases are chosen to be unbiased and correspond to
anti-commuting observables, σZ for input 0 and σX for input
1, to ensure that in learning about the value of one observable
Bob must forego information on the other. Once the mea-
surement bases are fixed, the states can be found which yield
the correct output with a maximal probability of 12 +
1
2
√
2
or approximately 85.36%. This encoding relates to conju-
cate encoding introduced by Wiesner [17] and is equivalent to
the quantum random-access codes considered in [18], which
were motivated by ideas of compression rather than security.
However, the concepts of one-time programs and random ac-
cess codes diverge when we consider hiding gates from Gk for
k > 1 later on.
With a method for implementing G1 now in place, we can
3proceed to construct a universal set of gates, for example G2,
while preventing Bob from learning the full truth table. As
alluded to previously, one way to achieve this is to insert hid-
den G1 gates into a fixed circuit, as shown in Fig. 2. The
exact choices required for each of the hidden gates to achieve
a specific G2 gate is described in the Supplementary Informa-
tion. The overall success probability for gates constructed in
this way is 75%. However, such an approach yields a rather
complicated construction for gates in Gk for k > 2 and intro-
duces complications in the security analysis. A more appeal-
ing approach is to directly implement probabilistic one-time
programs for gates in Gk. This can be done by generalising
the construction used in the k = 1 case. Specifically, each
possible input is assigned a unique observable from a set of
anti-commuting multi-qubit Pauli operators {σi}, where a +1
measurement outcome is taken to correspond to a gate output
of 0 and a −1 outcome is taken to correspond to an output of
1. As before, the states encoding each gate G are chosen to
maximise the average probability that the outcome of measur-
ing the observable corresponding to input x results in output
G(x). Unlike the case for G1, there is an entire subspace of
states satisfying this constraint for a given G. Our approach is
to encode G as the maximum entropy state maximising suc-
cess probability,
ρG =
1
tr(I)
I+ 1√
2k
2k−1∑
i=0
(−1)G(i) σi
 . (1)
This coincides with the definition a particular type of random
access code, known as a parity oblivious random access code,
explored in [19] for other purposes. The success probabil-
ity for any input i is then given by 12
(
1 + (−1)G(i)tr(ρGσi)
)
which simplifies to 12
(
1 + 2−
k
2
)
. Remarkably, this results
in each ρG being the maximally mixed state of a 2k−1-
dimensional subspace, so that the von Neumann entropy is
k − 1.
The implementation of Gk gates requires 2k anti-
commuting operators and 2k−1 qubits. However, there is an
alternative implementation that uses 2k−1 qubits whose Pauli
operators are restricted to being tensor products of the iden-
tity, σX and σZ . While there is no fundamental reason to
require such a restriction, it can reduce the hardware require-
ments necessary to implement the scheme, as seen in the ex-
perimental section. These encodings form the basis for the ex-
perimental implementations with elliptically and linearly po-
larised photons respectively.
Explicit gate construction
Here we show the explicit form of single-photon states that
can be combined to encode all G1 and G2 gates as shown in
the Supplementary Information.
Gates with 1 bit of input
The simplest case of program is one that accepts one bit of
input and returns one bit of output. The truth tables for all
such G1 gates (shown in Fig. 2c) may be easily encoded as:
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|0〉+ |+〉) , (2a)
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|1〉 − |−〉) , (2b)
|ΨId〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|0〉+ |−〉) , (2c)
|Ψnot〉 = 1√
2 +
√
2
(|1〉+ |+〉) , (2d)
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉).
Gates with 2 bits of input
All G2 gates can be encoded using either a combination
of three states from Equations 2a-2d (which corresponds to
the linear scheme) or a combination of two states (elliptical
scheme), in which case the above mentioned states need to be
combined with additional states from the following list:
|Ψe0〉 =
(
+
1
2
− 1√
2
i
)
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉 , (3a)
|Ψe1〉 =
(
−1
2
− 1√
2
i
)
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉 , (3b)
|Ψe2〉 =
1
2
|0〉+
(
+
1
2
+
1√
2
i
)
|1〉 , (3c)
|Ψe3〉 =
1
2
|0〉+
(
−1
2
+
1√
2
i
)
|1〉 , (3d)
|Ψe4〉 =
(
+
1
2
+
1√
2
i
)
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉 , (3e)
|Ψe5〉 =
(
−1
2
+
1√
2
i
)
|0〉+ 1
2
|1〉 , (3f)
|Ψe6〉 =
1
2
|0〉+
(
+
1
2
− 1√
2
i
)
|1〉 , (3g)
|Ψe7〉 =
1
2
|0〉+
(
−1
2
− 1√
2
i
)
|1〉 . (3h)
The encoding of specific gates is done according to tables
shown in the Supplementary Information. In the linear and
elliptical scheme, the gate-encoding state is a tensor prod-
uct state of three or two photons, respectively. In the linear
scheme, each of the three photons are in a state given in Equa-
tions 2a-2d. As there are 64 combinations and only 16 gates,
each gate can be encoded in four different ways (represented
by orthogonal state vectors), and a random choice is made
each time the gate must be encoded. In the elliptical scheme,
the first photon is in a state given in Equations 2a-2d, while
4the second photon is in a state given in Equations 3a-3h. As
there are 32 combinations and only 16 gates, each gate can be
encoded in two different ways, and again a random choice is
made each time the gate must be encoded. The random choice
between orthogonal state vectors is made by the sender and it
is irrelevant from the point of view of the receiver. Thus, the
state as seen by the receiver is effectively the mixed state given
in Equation 1.
Experimental implementation
To demonstrate the viability of the presented scheme we
show a proof-of-principle implementation based on polarisa-
tion encoded photonic qubits (Fig. 3a).
We realized two equivalent schemes: we refer to the first
one as the linear scheme because it can be implemented using
only linearly polarised photons. This version requires fewer
technological resources: Alice and Bob each need just one
liquid crystal retarder (LCR). These LCRs rotate the polar-
ization of each photon by an angle depending on the applied
voltage and are therefore used to actively switch from one po-
larisation setting (corresponding to a gate or a measurement
basis) to the next. However, in this encoding three photons
per G2 gate are required. Our elliptical scheme uses ellipti-
cally polarised states and requires two LCRs per party. The
advantage of this scheme is that it only requires two photons
per G2 gate, reducing the length of the program by a third.
For both versions we tested all 16 gates comprising G2 for
all four possible inputs (00, 01, 10, 11). The average success
probability of each gate is shown in Fig. 3b, and the results
are in good agreement with the expected value of 0.75. We
characterized all single-photon states using quantum state to-
mography [23] where a fidelity, F ≥ 0.991± 0.008 could be
achieved for all states (see Table III for details).
Experimental setup
Our single-photon source is based on spontaneous paramet-
ric down conversion (SPDC) using a Sagnac loop [20–22].
The pump beam is generated by a 4.5 mW diode laser at a
central wavelength of 394.5 nm, followed by a half- and a
quarter-wave plate to adjust the polarisation. It was focused
on a 20 mm long, type-II colinear periodically poled Potas-
sium Titanyl Phosphate crystal placed inside the loop, which
emitted photon pairs at 789 nm in a separable state |H〉 |V 〉,
where H and V denote horizontal and vertical polarization re-
spectively. The down-converted photons were reflected by a
dichroic mirror while the pump beam was transmitted. Ad-
ditionally long-pass and band-pass filters were used to block
the pump beam and to select the desired wavelength for the
photon pairs. The down-converted photons were then coupled
into single-mode fibres and one was directly sent to a detector
to herald the second photon. The source was configured in
a way that we observed a typical two-photon coincidence-rate
FIG. 3: Experimental one-time program implementation. a) shows
our setup: Marked in green are the liquid crystal retarders (LCR)
and quarter-wave plate (QWP) used to manipulate the polarisation
state of single photons which corresponds to setting the individual
gates of the encoded program. The LCRs marked in red are used
by Bob to set the measurement basis according to the gate inputs.
On Alice’s side an active switch is implemented based on a Pockels
cell placed between two crossed polarisers acting as a fast switch-
ing half-wave plate. Alice produces single photons with a source
in a Sagnac configuration [20–22]. In b) we show the average suc-
cess probability per gate for all G2 gates. Blue dots represent the
results for the linear scheme, green dots the results for the ellipti-
cal scheme and the theoretically predicted value is shown by the red
line. The gates are labelled by the last column of their truth table,
e.g. (00→0, 01→1, 10→0, 11→0) corresponds to 0100.
of 2 kHz with an open switch and the ratio of multi-pair events
to single-pair events was <0.07 %. The possibility of multi-
pair emissions is a property of every SPDC process which in
our case could lead to the transmission of more than one pho-
ton at once through the switch and therefore cause unwanted
information leaking to the client. Should a future applica-
tion require even lower (or vanishing) multi-pair emission this
could be implemented using alternative single photon sources
[24–27].
Furthermore we implemented an active switch based on a
KD*P (potassium dideuterium phosphate) Pockels cell with
a half-wave voltage of 6.3 kV and two crossed polarisers.
The electronic signal from the avalanche photo diode detec-
tor (APD) in the heralding path was sent to a splitterbox which
5could produce an on and off signal for the driver of the Pockels
cell. The pulses were separated by 46 ns which corresponds
to the opening time of the switch. During this time voltage is
applied to the Pockels cell, causing it to act as a HWP.
These pulses are gated to ensure photons are not transmitted
while the LCRs are changing. Once the LCRs are ready to set
a state in the program, a gating signal is sent to the splitterbox.
Only then will the next heralding signal cause an on/off pulse
to be sent to the Pockels cell. All following herald signals will
be blocked until the splitterbox receives the next gate signal.
The splitterbox itself causes a delay of the electric signal of
22 ns while the total electronic delay of splitterbox and con-
trol electronics is 80 ns. The Pockels cell has a rise-time of
8 ns. To allow for the switch to be opened before the signal
photon reaches the Pockels cell in spite of all electronic de-
lays the signal photon is delayed in a 29 m single mode fibre.
All necessary polarisation states were set using a combina-
tion of two LCRs and a QWP at 0°. The maximum time to
switch between two states in our scheme was 60 ms. This was
therefore the time allowed for every switching process (so as
not to leak information about the prepared state because of a
shorter switching time). To measure the states in the bases
dictated by the inputs to the gates a second set of two LCRs
was used followed by a PBS and two APDs to measure the
photons. Typically 4 % of the times the switch opened a pho-
ton was also detected at Bob’s side. This was due to losses
in the setup as well as the limited detection efficiency of the
APDs. Together with the LCR switching time of 60 ms this
lead to an of average gate time of 1.4 s per photon.
Demonstrated programs
To demonstrate the applicability of our scheme we have ex-
perimentally implemented two different classes of one-time
programs.
The first class we consider is a program built from a com-
bination of G2 gates which are universal for classical compu-
tation. We use it to solve Yao’s Millionaires Problem [14], in
which two people wish to compare their wealth without dis-
closing this value to the other party. To accomplish this goal,
Alice encodes her wealth into the program. Bob’s wealth will
be his input (see Fig. A of the Supplementary Information).
The program returns a single bit, indicating which number is
larger. We ran the Millionaires Problem using both the linear
and the elliptical schemes on several inputs. Alice encoded
a four-bit number and Bob compared it to numbers that each
differed in one bit from Alice’s input. The detailed results are
shown in Fig. 4. In good agreement with our theoretical ex-
pectations, it can be seen that the probability of success rises
with the significance of the bit in which the two numbers differ
(i.e. it is easier to discriminate two numbers that differ in the
most significant bit than two that differ in the least significant
bit).
The second kind of program we consider concerns the del-
egation of digital signatures or one time power of attorney.
FIG. 4: Success probability for the Millionaires Problem using the
linear (blue/first bar) and elliptical (green/second bar) scheme. We
compare different four-bit numbers in binary representation to the
number 0101, where each compared number deviates from 0101 in
exactly one bit. The expected probability of success (shown in black
dotted lines) depends on the position of the differing bit (1 corre-
sponds to the most significant bit, 4 to the least significant bit). Error
bars derive from binomial statistics.
Here Alice can enable Bob to sign one, and only one, mes-
sage of his choice with a signature derived from her private
key. However, due to the probabilistic nature of the described
OTPs, there is a non-negligible probability that OTPs will not
output the correct signature. To compensate for this we may
repeat the procedure and define some threshold number of sig-
natures which is announced publicly to be an acceptable num-
ber required to verify a given message has been signed. Alice
produces many distinct OTPs each using a different private
key such that Bob has a high probability of forming the re-
quired number of signatures for a single message.
Standard signature schemes use a public key for verification
[28]. However, due to technical reasons limiting our gate rate
in experiment, we restrict our demonstration to a symmetric
digital signature scheme, wherein Alice’s private key is used
to verify a signature. Such a program may be utilised for a
third party to spend an amount of money on someone else’s
behalf, so that they should pay anyone with a signed receit.
An overview of this scheme is shown in Fig. 5a. Bob com-
putes a hash of the message he wishes to sign and uses this
as the input to the OTPs (using a hash ensures that the input
length does not depend on the length of the actual message
signed). The output of the OTPs will then be the digital sig-
nature which Alice may verify. For each bit of this hash Alice
provides 300 G1 gates, from which Bob produces a bit string
dependent on the result of measuring according to that bit.
Such a bit string may be compared by Alice to the ideal case
where all gates have been implemented on the correspond-
ing hash bit. We require that each bit string matches such an
ideal string in at least τ positions to produce a valid signa-
ture. The threshold τ is chosen as a function of the bit string
length T to maximise the difference between the probabilities
6FIG. 5: Private key one-time signature scheme. a) Overview of the
private key one-time signature scheme. Alice encodes her signature
program as noisy quantum OTPs, and sends them to Bob via a quan-
tum channel. Bob measures the states according to the hash of a
message he wishes to sign, with outputs corresponding to a signa-
ture. This message and signature pair may be verified by Alice at a
later stage. b) Bob’s success probabilities of signing a message or
messages, in both the honest (one message) and the dishonest (two
messages) case. The probability of the client successfully generating
a valid signature is plotted against the threshold value for number
of correct bits required to sign a message, given that the client is
provided with 300 OTPs for each row of the table. The green line
shows the probability of an honest client generating a single signa-
ture (≥ τ correct outputs for each row of the signature), as a function
of the threshold number of correct bits required in each row. The
blue line shows probability of a dishonest client generating two sig-
natures, which differ only by one bit in the hash (the probability of
a client following an honest strategy in all but one row). The differ-
ence between the probabilities of the prior two lines is indicated by
the yellow line. Details are given in the Supplementary Information.
of success of the honest and dishonest strategies, wherein a
dishonest strategy Bob would attempt to sign two hashes dif-
fering only by a single bit. This is illustrated in Fig. 5b and in
Fig. B of the Supplementary Information. As T is increased
the probability of an honest Bob forming a sufficient fraction
of correct bits (> τ/T ) in each bit string approaches 1, while
that of a dishonest user who would try to form multiple signa-
tures, approaches 0. This demonstrates a clear example of a
case where even probabilistic one-time programs enable new
functionality that is inexecutable using classical technology.
Security analysis
We will now discuss the security of our protocol and show a
strict advantage over any possible classical strategy. We note
that the security relies on several measures affecting differ-
ent steps of our protocol. Starting with the logical synthe-
sis we see that when gate-OTPs are combined into circuits,
there is some freedom over how the gates are chosen. In our
proof-of-principle demonstration of Yao’s millionaires prob-
lem we limit the information accessible to Bob by randomly
inserting pairs of NOT gates into the circuit immediately af-
ter each gate-OTP with probability one-half. The first NOT
gate is absorbed backwards into the gate-OTP, altering the en-
coded gate. The second NOT of the pair is propagated for-
ward, through any present fan-out and XOR gates, and ab-
sorbed into the next layer of gate-OTPs, altering the function
they encode. Such a procedure can always be applied to any
circuit composed of gate-OTPs along with XOR, NOT and
fan-out operations.
To analyse the effect of this randomisation procedure, we
will assume it is applied after every gate-OTP. In such a case,
the joint state of the quantum systems used to encode the gate-
OTPs is maximally mixed, and hence independent of the en-
coded function. For those gate-OTPs which produce the out-
put of the program the second NOT gate cannot be absorbed
into a subsequent gate-OTP. We will simply eliminate this sec-
ond NOT gate, effectively applying a one-time pad to the pro-
gram’s output and creating the maximally mixed state from
the perspective of the receiver. Such a scheme thus negates
all losses in the system as the maximally mixed state does not
allow a dishonest user to extract any information regarding
the intended gate-OTP. Since the output of the program can
be revealed by decoding the one-time pad, the accessible in-
formation for the entire system can be no greater than the size
of this encryption key, and hence can be no greater than the
number of output bits for the program. This is in line with the
requirement that a one-time program should reveal no more
information than can be obtained from a single run of the pro-
gram.
We now consider the security of the individual gate-OTPs
corresponding to gates in G1. We show that strictly less can be
learned from a single copy of them than from a single query
to the encoded function (i.e. an ideal one-time implementa-
tion of that function). For all gates G ∈ G1, the corresponding
state ρG is pure, and so we will denote the state vector as |ψG〉.
Fig. 6 shows how a single query of the encoded function can
be used to produce two copies of this state. The fact that states
encoding different programs are non-orthogonal, coupled with
the no-cloning theorem [2, 3], implies it is not possible to pro-
duce two copies of |ψG〉 from a single copy, and hence strictly
less can be learned about G from a single copy of |ψG〉 than
from a single (coherent) query to the function it encodes.
We conclude our analysis by discussing the security of G1
and G2 gates. We show that the gate-OTPs we have explored
here have strict advantages over any purely classical compu-
7tational procedure. First, we choose an appropriate figure
of merit for which to compare quantum and classical noisy
OTPs. An ideal OTP would allow for one, and only one, eval-
uation of the encoded function, resulting in exactly one input-
output pair. We will therefore choose the average probability
of evaluating a specific input-output pair correctly, P1, com-
pared to the average probability of correctness when evaluat-
ing all input-output pairs P˜1. In the classical case information
can always be copied. Therefore, a classical procedure pro-
ducing one input-output pair with some fixed probability of
success can be repeated arbitrarily many times to produce a
noisy version of the encoded gate. The probability of getting
a specific input-output pair is equal to the average probability
across all input-output pairs, thus PC1 = P˜
C
1 . However, for
Gk OTPs this is not the case. If we fix the single line prob-
ability of success such that PC1 = P
Q
1 we find that, for G1
gates P˜Q1 = 0.75 while P˜
C
1 ≈ 0.8536. Similarly, for G2 we
find that P˜Q1 = 0.625 while P˜
C
1 = 0.75. This shows that
our encoding gives an advantage over the best possible classi-
cal scheme for an equivalent P1. Details of these calculations
can be found in the Supplementary Information, where it is
also shown that success probability can be boosted via error-
correction while still maintaining an advantage. Furthermore,
in the case of G1 gates, we may state that the probability of an
adversary finding the parity of two lines, which gives an upper
bound on the probability of guessing the complete truth table,
is strictly lowers than in any possible classical encoding. This
includes noisy implementations of oblivious transfer [29, 30]
as our G1 gates are equivalent to noisy
(
1
2
)
-oblivious transfer.
Remarkably, even though oblivious transfer with a vanishing
error probability is known to be impossible [30, 31] with our
digital signature scheme we were able to present an imple-
mentation whose overall success probability can approach 1.
Aside from the inherent security of an ideal implementa-
tion of gate-OTPs, additional measures are necessary in the
presence of communication over lossy channels. It is not in
general advisable for Alice to simply resend qubits that are
not received by Bob, since he can simply claim to have lost a
photon to receive a new copy and hence gain additional infor-
mation about the encoded gate-OTP. This may be prevented
via a simple subroutine: for each gate several copies of each
state are produced, but each with a randomly chosen addi-
tional one-time pad (i.e. a bit flip on the output of all possible
inputs). These states are thus in the maximally mixed state as
observed from the client and provide no information. Alice
will reveal only the one-time pad for the state that Bob con-
firms to have received and that she wants him to use. Bob
will then keep or flip his measurement result, according to Al-
ice’s one-time pad and proceed with the next gate following
the same procedure. This procedure has been used in each of
the demonstrated programs.
FIG. 6: Security of probabilistic one-time programs. The quantum
circuit produces two copies of the state |ψG〉 for any G ∈ G1. Here
OG implements a reversible version of the encoded gate G mapping
|x, y〉 to |x, y ⊕G(x)〉 and W = [c, s; s,−c], where c = cos(pi/8)
and s = sin(pi/8).
Discussion
Here we have shown the implementation of probabilistic
one-time programs in theory and experiment. Our results
demonstrate that quantum physics allows for better security
trade-offs for certain secure computing tasks than are possi-
ble in the classical world, even when perfect security cannot
be achieved. This is achieved without assumptions on compu-
tational hardness, noisy storage or difficulty of entanglement.
Using readily available technology we find our results are in
excellent agreement with the theoretical predictions. Future
advances in technology that would allow for non-separable
measurements on the client’s side could be used to further
improve our implementation. We believe the presented work
strongly hints at a rich area of quantum protocols to enhance
the security of classical computation, even before large-scale
quantum computers can be realised.
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Advantage over classical encodings for G1 gates
We will show that the quantum implementation of G1 gates
can hide more information than a classical scheme about the
result of multiple lines of a truth table. This will be done by
obtaining an inequality which must be satisfied by all classical
schemes but is violated by the quantum scheme described in
the main text.
We consider a situation where Bob is interested in the par-
ity of some subset of lines of the truth table, which gives us
a bound on the probability of identifying these lines in the
subset exactly. Using equation 1 of the main text, he con-
siders two states that are formed by summing over all states
with equal parity over the subset of lines he is interested in.
For subsets consisting of more than one line, these two states
are equal and thus impossible to distinguish. In other words,
while a single line of the truth table can be found with prob-
ability larger than 12 , the parity of two or more lines is com-
pletely hidden. For comparison, a classical scheme that en-
codes G1 gates with single-line error probability higher than
3/4 must give correct results about the parity of two lines
with probability higher than 1/2. In particular, if the single-
line error probability is 12 +
1
2
√
2
(the same as achieved with
the quantum states in equation 1 of the main text), the classi-
cal scheme must allow the parity of two lines to be correctly
identified with probability at least 1/
√
2, which is greater than
1/2.
In order to improve the probability of getting the correct
output from a particular gate, the programmer may send mul-
tiple copies, c, of the state corresponding to this gate. The
client is expected to make some (possibly non-local) multi-
qubit measurement to evaluate the line of the truth table corre-
sponding to their input. In this case the statement that the par-
ity of multiple lines of the truth table of the encoded gates are
perfectly hidden is no longer valid. Sending multiple copies
of the state in equation 1 of the main text creates a trade-off
situation between precision and security, where precision is
quantified by the success probability that an honest client can
achieve when evaluating a single line, and security is quan-
tified by the amount of information that can be found about
multiple lines of the truth table simultaneously. A complete
lack of security occurs when the client can perfectly identify
which one of the gates is represented by the quantum state he
possesses.
We will now make a comparison between a quantum
scheme and what could be achieved by a classical scheme.
Any classical scheme encoding a gate can be repeatedly rerun
to generate a noisy truth table for the encoded gate. We will
see that these noisy truth tables must satisfy an inequality that
bounds the maximum level of security that can be achieved
for a given level of precision. This inequality is violated in
the quantum case, allowing us to achieve more security for
the same level of precision than any classical scheme.
Analytical results - Classical scheme for G1 gates
Without loss of generality, we consider a classical model
in which a programmer introduces some errors in the gate
truth table. These are errors purposefully introduced at com-
pile time. There is no point in introducing random errors at
run time, since the client can evaluate the truth table multiple
times and find the most common value with high probability.
If there is some anti-correlation in the presence of errors in
different lines, then the probability of getting a second line
correct is decreased when conditioned on getting the first line
correct.
To obtain this anti-correlation we consider that the pro-
grammer introduces h errors in the truth table (with 0 ≤ h ≤
2) with probability Eh (so E0 + E1 + E2 = 1). If one error
is introduced it can affect either line with equal probability.
Thus for an honest client interested in a single line of the truth
table, the average probability that the obtained result is correct
is
FC1 = E0 +
1
2
E1 (4)
Meanwhile, for a dishonest client interested in the parity of
both lines, the probability that the obtained result is correct is
FC2 = E0 + E2 (5)
We can invert these equations to findEh in terms of FC1 and
FC2 . This tells the programmer what is the probability distribu-
tion in the number of errors that need to be introduced in order
to produce an encoding that is characterized by given values
of the probability of decoding a single line and of decoding
the parity of both lines. This leads to the result
E0 = F
C
1 +
1
2
FC2 −
1
2
(6a)
E1 = 1− FC2 (6b)
E2 =
1
2
− FC1 +
1
2
FC2 (6c)
Each of these terms must be non-negative, which is only pos-
sible if
FC2 ≥
∣∣2FC1 − 1∣∣ (7)
This means that an attempt at a classical noisy gate which
outputs correct results with probability FC1 also allows one to
probe the parity of both lines of its truth table with probability
greater than
∣∣2FC1 − 1∣∣. However, we will see that a quan-
tum implementation of the noisy OTPs violate this inequality,
showing that it hides more information about other lines of the
truth table than is possible classically.
Analytical results - Quantum scheme for G1 gates
The figure of merit that we consider for security in this sec-
tion is Fh, the probability of success in calculating the par-
ity of a subset of the lines of the truth table, as a function of
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the size h of this subset (with 1 ≤ h ≤ 2 in the case of G1
gates, whose truth table has only two lines). The outcome of
the parity determination is binary, so we can use known re-
sults on quantum state discrimination of two quantum states.
Specifically, the optimal probability of distinguishing them is
uniquely determined by the 1-norm of half of their difference.
For an honest client who is interested in only the first line of
the truth table, the probability of success is related to the 1-
norm of the operator
Aˆ1 =
1
4
ρ⊗c00 +
1
4
ρ⊗c01 −
1
4
ρ⊗c10 −
1
4
ρ⊗c11 (8)
while for a dishonest client who is interested in obtaining the
parity of both lines, the probability of success is related to the
1-norm of the operator
Aˆ2 =
1
4
ρ⊗c00 −
1
4
ρ⊗c01 −
1
4
ρ⊗c10 +
1
4
ρ⊗c11 (9)
Gates with one bit of input may be encoded as pure states,
so providing multiple copies of them does not increase the di-
mensionality of the effective Hilbert space, which is spanned
by at most four linearly independent vectors. For simplicity,
we consider the case where the number of copies is odd and
obtain the following results
FQ1 ≡
1
2
+
1
2
∥∥∥Aˆ1∥∥∥
1
=
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 1
2c
(10)
FQ2 ≡
1
2
+
1
2
∥∥∥Aˆ2∥∥∥
1
=
1
2
+
1
2
√
1− 2
2c
(11)
where the superscript Q refer to a quantum implementation.
These values do not satisfy the inequality in Equation 7. This
means that, if we compare a classical scheme which offers the
same level of precision for an honest client (i.e., FC1 = F
Q
1 ),
the probability of success for a dishonest client is higher in
the classical case. Similarly, if we restrict the two protocols
to the same level of security as quantified by the probability
of finding the parity of both lines, then the quantum OTP can
offer better performance for honest clients than any classical
scheme.
Advantage over classical encodings for other gates
We demonstrate the advantage of the quantum one-time
programs with multiple bits of input over possible classical
schemes. We assume that the gate-OTP is a priori equally
likely to encode any of the possible gates in Gk. Although we
will focus on G2 gates, parts of this discussion can be general-
ized to Gk gates with k > 1.
We consider the probability distribution for (potentially cor-
related) Bernoulli random variablesXi, which are equal to 1 if
and only if a query to the a noisy classical truth table encoding
gate G for input i returns G (i). All probability distributions
over truth tables can be described in this way, and so it can be
used to obtain a bound on the trade-offs inherent in any classi-
cal scheme. The sender does not know in advance which lines
of the truth table the client might be interested, thus his/her in-
terest is in minimizing the worst-case probability of correctly
obtaining the output for multiple lines across all sets of lines.
To do that, every line is treated in an equivalent way, and so
all the elements on the diagonal of the covariance matrix of
the Bernoulli variables Xi will be equal, as will be all off-
diagonal elements. The covariance matrix thus has the form
uI − vM, where I is the identity matrix and M is the matrix
with all entries equal to one. In order to obtain a fixed proba-
bility P1 of correctness for a single query to a line of the truth
table, it must be the case that u− v = P1−P 21 . Furthermore,
since the minimum eigenvalue of such a matrix is u−2kv and
covariance matrices are positive semi-definite, it must be the
case that u − v ≥ (2k − 1)v. With these arguments, it’s pos-
sible to bound the probability of obtaining the correct values
for two lines (indexed by x and y, with x 6= y) of such a truth
table,
P˜2 = E(XxXy)
= E((Xx − P1)(Xy − P1)) + P 21
= −v + p2
≥ − (u− v)
2k − 1 + P
2
1
=
P 21 − P1
2k − 1 + P
2
1
=
2kP 21 − P1
2k − 1 (12)
As the probability of evaluating a single line of a G2 OTP is
P1 = 0.75, a noisy classical truth table with the same success
probability gives P˜1 = 0.75 across all lines. The probabil-
ity of correctly decoding a pair of lines is at least P˜2 = 0.5,
independently of the chosen pair of lines.
We may now compare this to the average probability of
finding the output values of encoded gates for pairs of inputs.
In the quantum case, if the client is interested in a particular
line of the truth table, it’s possible to implement a quantum
measurement strategy that is specifically tuned to increase the
probability of getting this value correctly. However, this de-
grades the available information about the other lines. Thus,
in a marked difference to the classical scheme, the probability
P1 of finding the correct value of a particular line is different
(and higher) than the average probability P˜1 of getting a line
correctly when the client is trying to identify the whole truth
table. The same argument is valid when the client is interested
in a given pair of lines, as compared to the average probability
of correctly identifying pairs of lines when trying to identify
the whole truth table.
Using the quantum encoding without error correction, a
client interested in a given line of the truth table of a G2 gate
can correctly identify it with probability equal to 0.75. On the
other hand, when the client tries to identify the whole truth
table, the average success probability is only 0.625. Looking
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at pairs of lines, making a specific measurement can allow the
client to obtain a probability of success equal to 0.5, but the
average over all lines in a measurement of all lines is only
0.375.
Optimal measurements
We turn our attention to the measurement strategy that a
dishonest client could follow if he is interested in identify-
ing all lines of the truth table of an encoded gate G. This
problem is cast as a quantum state discrimination of one state
among 2k alternatives, and the figure of merit is the probabil-
ity of making a correct guess about the entirety of the truth
table. We will consider the pretty good measurement strategy
introduced by Hausladen and Wootters [1] and another strat-
egy introduced by Jez˘ek, Reha´c˘ek and Fiura´s˘ek [2]. Because
of some properties of the way that the gates are encoded in
quantum states, these two strategies are equal and also opti-
mal, because they obey established criterias [3].
Considering an ensemble of states {ρi} with a priori dis-
tributions {qi}, there are several good measurement strategies
for distinguishing them. One candidate strategy is the pretty
good measurement, or PGM [1], for which the POVM corre-
spoding to an output x (where x is a 2k-bit string representing
the truth table) is
MPGMx =
(∑
s=1
qsρs
)−1/2+
qxρx
(∑
l=s
qsρs
)−1/2+
(13)
where the operation A−1/2
+
is defined as
A−1/2
+
=
∑
j:aj>0
a
−1/2
j |aj〉 〈aj | (14)
with aj and |aj〉 being the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of
A. In a similar manner, slightly more complex sets of mea-
surement operators may be formed that are called the Jez˘ek-
Reha´c˘ek-Fiura´s˘ek iterative measurement operators [2]. These
are defined recursively, where each iteration is indexed by w.
MJRF,wx =
(∑
s=1
q2sρsM
(w−1)
s ρs
)−1/2+
q2xρxM
(w−1)
x ρx
×
(∑
s=1
q2sρsM
(w−1)
s ρs
)−1/2+
(15)
where in the first iteration MJRF,0x = I/2k.
Due to the form of our states, each satisfy ρ2x = ξρx, ∀x,
where ξ is a proportionality constant independent of x. Cou-
pled with an assumption that the states are a priori equiprob-
able (so that qx = ζ, ∀x, where ζ is a constant independent
of x), the PGM operators are equal to every iteration of the
JRF operators.
It is known that a POVM strategy is optimal if it satisfies
the following two conditions [3],
Mx (qxρx − qyρy)My = 0 ,∀x, y (16)
2k−1∑
x=0
qxρxMx − qyρy  0 ,∀y (17)
In a numerical study, we have verified that the PGM strategy
is optimal when ρx represents three or less copies of the gate-
encoding states.
Optimality of the measurement for single copies
We now give an analytical proof that the PGM strategy is
optimal when a single copy of the quantum states is sent. First
we note that, in the case of a single copy,
∑
s qsρs = I, assum-
ing as before that the states are a priori equiprobable (when
the number of copies is larger than one, then
∑
s psρs 6= I
even in the equiprobable case). Thus, the measurement oper-
ators Mx are proportional to the density matrices ρx.
We will now obtain a bound on the value of tr (ρxMxi)
using Ho¨lders inequality,
‖fg‖1 ≤ ‖f‖p‖g‖q (18)
which is valid when 1p +
1
q = 1. Assuming that each state is
equally probable and the normalization condition
∑
xMx =
I, this implies that tr (Mx) = D/2k ,∀x. We also note that
Mx  0 as required for POVMs. Using the values p = 1,
q = ∞, f = Mx and g = ρx in Ho¨lders inequality, we find
that
|tr(Mxρx)| = ‖Mixρx‖1
≤ ‖Mx‖1 ‖ρx‖∞
=
D
2k
2
D
= 21−k (19)
We now use the POVM given by the PGM (or JRF) oper-
ators and show that this saturates the above inequality.
tr(Mxρx) =
∑
j
ujrj
=
∑
j:uj ,rj 6=0
uj
2
D
= tr(Mx)
2
D
=
D
2k
2
D
= 21−k (20)
where uj and rj are the eigenvalues ofMx and ρx respectively
and we have used the fact that, because Mx ∝ ρx, they both
have degenerate eigenvalues in the same eigenbasis. As the
PGM/JRF measurement achieves the exact upper bound
on |tr(ρxMx)|, they must be optimal.
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Applying the optimal measurements
We now look at situation where the client uses these opera-
tors to try to learn what state was sent. We may quantify the
number of lines of the truth table the client can on average ob-
tain correctly. We define Eh as the probability that exactly h
lines are incorrect; in other words, h is the Hamming distance
between the encoded gate and the result of a measurement that
tries to identify the gate. We consider the average taken over
all gates in Gk, and hence over all ρx,
Eh =
∑
x
qx
∑
s:H(s,x)=h
tr (ρxMs) (21)
whereH (s, x) is the Hamming distance between the truth ta-
bles represented by s and x. From this average number of
errors, we can then consider the average probability of cor-
rectly identifying a subset of L lines, P˜L, which is given by
P˜1 = E0 +
(
3
1
)(
4
1
)E1 + (21)(4
1
)E2 + (11)(4
1
)E3
= E0 +
3
4
E1 +
1
2
E2 +
1
4
E3 (22a)
P˜2 = E0 +
(
3
2
)(
4
2
)E1 + (22)(4
2
)E2 = E0 + 1
2
E1 +
1
6
E2 (22b)
P˜3 = E0 +
(
3
3
)(
4
3
)E1 = E0 + 1
4
E1 (22c)
P˜4 = E0 (22d)
In Fig. C of the Supplementary Information, P˜1 in the quan-
tum case is plotted against P˜1 in the classical case, which is
simply the probability that a single line is correct, for G2 gates.
This shows a clear quantum advantage for noisy one time pro-
grams.
Description of the Private Key Signature scheme
This scheme allows Alice to delegate to Bob the power of
digitally signing a message of his choice once and only once.
To realize this, Alice’s digital signature will be formed by the
output of one-time programs. These OTPs take Bob’s message
as an input and output a valid signature. To allow the signing
algorithm to work on a fixed-size input Bob creates a hash
of his message using SHA3-224 protocol (there is no particu-
lar theoretical reliance on this or any particular hash, but we
chose to use SHA3-224 in our demonstration). The signature
is verified by Alice, the programmer, by comparing the gener-
ated signature against the ideal one that would be produced in
the case of perfect OTPs. For each bit of the hash the client is
provided with T OTPs, each of which is chosen uniformly at
random from the set of G1 OTPs (in principle we could use Gk
gates, but we chose to use k = 1 in our demonstration). The
client makes measurements on these states according to the
corresponding bit of his hash, producing an array where each
row corresponds to the output bits for a single hash bit. The
signature is deemed to pass if each row is correct in at least τ
places, wherein the threshold τ is a integer predetermined by
the programmer. We will show now how the scheme displays
a clear example of a situation where even probabilistic OTPs
may be used to implement a program which works with a high
probability of success.
We compare the probability of success of passing the ver-
ification step for an honest client signing one message to the
probability of passing the verification step twice for a dishon-
est client signing two messages which hash to different values.
We will consider the cases where the hashes differ by only one
bit. This is a worst case scenario in which an adversary has the
maximum probability of cheating successfully. The threshold
value τ is chosen to maximise the difference between the suc-
cess probabilities for an honest and a dishonest client in such
a case.
Probability that a dishonest client can pass the verification
step for a single bit of the hash:
The two signatures taken together constitute a string of lenght
2T . Each signature needs to be correct in at least τ places
to pass the verification stage and thus a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition for the combined string to pass is that it
matches the concatenation of the two ideal signatures in 2τ
places. We place an upper bound on the probability of this
happening by using a similar method to that used by Vazirani
[4]. The two ideal signatures are encoded in T qubits as is
the case when we are sending T G1 OTPs. It’s considered
that each of the 2T -bit strings corresponding to possible sig-
natures is mapped to a pure state |φx〉, while a measurement
that would output a 2T -bit string y is associated with a pro-
jector Py . This can be done without loss of generality since
the measurement projectors can be defined in a larger Hilbert
space than the received OTP state, since |φx〉 may contain an
arbitrary number of additional ancilla qubits. The probability
that at most h mistakes are made in such a decoding protocol
is given by
P ≡ Prob (H(x, y) ≤ h)
=
1
22T
∑
x,y:H(x,y)≤h
tr (Py |φx〉〈φx|) (23)
where H(x, y) is the Hamming distance between the strings
x and y.
At this moment it is helpful to analyse some properties of
the specific ways in which the |φx〉 states are defined. The 2T
bits of x are split in pairs corresponding to the i-th bit of each
signature, and each pair is encoded in a qubit using the model
for G1 gate-OTPs. Thus, all |φx〉 states can be written as
|φy〉 = |φy1〉 ⊗ |φy2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |φyT 〉 ⊗ |A〉 (24)
where yk ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} and |A〉 represents the state of
an arbitrary-dimensional ancilla, which does not depend on
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y. Two states |φx〉 and |φy〉 are orthogonal if there is at least
one pair of bits (which are encoded in the same qubit) which
differ between x and y in both bits. This suggests a way to find
an orthonormal basis for this space, by starting with any |φy〉
and obtain other states by negating pairs of bits from y. Since
there are T pairs to negate and all states obtained this way are
orthogonal to each other, they form a orthonormal basis with
2T elements. Given that the space spanned by possible OTP
states is of dimension 2T , and that every state can be written
as a linear combination of some others, this basis must span
the space generated by all |φy〉 states. We call this the y-basis.
Using these properties, we argue that that the operator∑
x:H(x,y)≤h |φx〉〈φx| is diagonal in the y-basis just defined,
and that |φy〉 is the eigenvector corresponding to its largest
eigenvalue. To see this, we need to consider what the strings
x appear in the sum. Specifically, for each string x where the
first bit of a given pair does not match the corresponding bit
in y (but the second bit of that pair does match), there is also
another string where the first bit matches but the second bit
does not match. These strings are always both included or
both excluded, because the Hamming distance between each
of them and y is the same. The mixture associated with these
two states is diagonal in the y basis, even though none of them
are individually.
With the eigenvectors already found, the task is to find
eigenvalues. For an eigenvector |φz〉, the eigenvalue depends
on how many strings x that are not orthogonal to z are in-
cluded in the summation. Because the summation over x is
centered around y (in the sense of the Hamming distance), the
eigenvector |φy〉 has the highest number of strings x appear-
ing in the sum. This leads to this eigenvalue being the highest
one. By a counting argument, it’s possible to arrive at its spe-
cific value. Strings x that appear in the sum are at Hamming
distance at most h from y, but if both bits of a given pair are
different in x and y then the state corresponding to this string
does not contribute. If a pair is equal in x and y, then the con-
tribution to 〈φy | φx〉 〈φx | φy〉 corresponding to that qubit is
1. If a pair has x and y differing in one bit, the contribution to
〈φy | φx〉 〈φx | φy〉 is 1/2, but because there are two of those
states, their sum also constributes 1. Thus, when a Hamming
distance of w between x and y is considered, we must con-
sider only terms where there is either zero or one differences
per pair, with each configuration contributing 1. The eigen-
value corresponding to |φy〉 is then
λ =
h∑
w=0
(
T
w
)
(25)
This was explicitly checked for small values of T by numeri-
cal diagonalization.
We can now find an upper bound to the probability
Prob (H(x, y) ≤ h) that a dishonest client can make at most h
mistakes in the determination of the 2T -bit string correspond-
ing to the ideal signatures for two distinct messages. Contin-
uing from Equation 23, we have that
P = 1
22T
∑
y
tr
Py ∑
x:H(x,y)<=h
|φx〉〈φx|

≤ 1
22T
∑
y
tr (PyQ)
h∑
w=0
(
T
w
)
(26)
where Q is a projector to the codespace spanned by the code-
words |φx〉, which has dimension 2T . Then,
P ≤ 1
22T
tr
((∑
y
Py
)
Q
)
h∑
w=0
(
T
w
)
=
1
22T
tr (Q)
h∑
w=0
(
T
w
)
=
1
2T
h∑
w=0
(
T
w
)
(27)
If h/T < (1/2)− , for any positive constant , the proba-
bility of obtaining an output string within Hamming distance
h of the ideal signature string is exponentially small in T . Re-
turning to the definition of h as 2T − 2τ , we see that the ex-
ponential suppression happens when the ratio τ/T is fixed as
any constant greater than 3/4. We now have an upper bound
for the probability of success of a dishonest client passing the
verification step for a single bit of the hash for two differ-
ent inputs. As we assume a worst case scenario, where the
hashes differ in only a single bit the client can follow the hon-
est scenario for all other bits of his hash. Therefore, the overall
probability of a dishonest client to sign two such messages is
simply given by the product of the individual success proba-
bilities per bit.
It becomes increasingly unlikely that the client is able to
sign two messages if the required threshold for signing one
message is set as a constant fraction α > 3/4 of T . If the
threshold τ is set at lower than
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)
T ≈ (0.85)·T , the
honest client is able to sign a single message with probability
that approaches 1 as T is increased.
In conclusion, when the threshold τ is chosen to lie between
(0.75) · T and (0.85) · T , a client can sign one message with
high probability but can sign two messages with low probabil-
ity. In the limit of high T , these probabilities tend to 1 and 0,
respectively. For practical reasons, as a trade-off between se-
curity and speed, we chose the values T = 300 and τ = 234,
which results in a client being able to sign one message with
probability 97%, but with a smaller than 4% probability of
signing two messages which hashes to strings differing in only
one bit. This is an upper bound to the cases where the hashes
are different in more than one bit. Another interesting feature
of the protocol is that it does not require a perfect implemen-
tation of the quantum states. Noise can be tolerated as long as
the probability of obtaining a correct outcome for a single line
of the G1 OTP is higher than 75%, provided that τ is chosen
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accordingly and T is high enough such that the client can sign
one message with reasonably high probability.
Supplementary Figures
FIG. A: Circuit diagram for the implemented solution to the Million-
aires Problem. Alice encodes her input in binary representation by
sending an OR gate for each bit with the value 0 and an AND gate
for each bit with the value 1.
FIG. B: The histogram presents the result of the experimental im-
plementation of a delegated digital signature scheme, showing the
distribution of number of correct output bits in each row compared
to the theoretically expected values when a row length of 300 was
used. In the experimental implementation the threshold τ = 234
was chosen as this value maximises the difference between the suc-
cess probabilities of the honest and dishonest client. It can be seen
that this threshold was passed for every row. Considering the ex-
pected deviation due to the probabilistic nature of the scheme and
experimental imperfections, the results are in good agreement with
the theoretical predictions. Solid green line: the binomial distribution
wherein each G1 OTP has the theoretically expected success proba-
bility for a perfect implementation of probability of correctly giving
the correct output. Dotted green line: the binomial distribution based
around the average probability of success that could be realised in the
experiment (this being slightly reduced compared to the theoretical
prediction due to experimental imperfections). Histogram bars are of
width 3, with values taken from a single evaluation of a signature.
FIG. C: The average probability of success when trying to find all
lines of a truth table in the quantum case P˜1 is plotted against the
probability of finding exactly one line, P1, and compared to classical
case. The different probabilities of success for a single line could in
the quantum case be achieved by using error correction as described
in the Supplementary Information. This shows the probability that a
single line is correct, for G2 gates and demonstrates a clear quantum
advantage for the noisy one time programs.
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Supplementary Tables
Gate Encoding states
0000

|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0001

|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0010

|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0011

|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0100

|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0101

|ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0110

|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
0111

|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
Gate Encoding states
1000

|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1001

|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1010

|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1011

|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1100

|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1101

|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1110

|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
1111

|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |ΨId〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψnot〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψ1〉
TABLE I: Encoding scheme for gates, using the three-photon, linear
scheme.
Gate Encoding states
0000
{
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe0〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe4〉
0001
{
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe1〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe5〉
0010
{
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe2〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe6〉
0011
{
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe3〉
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe7〉
0100
{
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe0〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe4〉
0101
{
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe1〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe5〉
0110
{
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe2〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe6〉
0111
{
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe3〉
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe7〉
Gate Encoding states
1000
{
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe0〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe4〉
1001
{
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe1〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe5〉
1010
{
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe2〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe6〉
1011
{
|Ψnot〉 ⊗ |Ψe3〉
|ΨId〉 ⊗ |Ψe7〉
1100
{
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe0〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe4〉
1101
{
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe1〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe5〉
1110
{
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe2〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe6〉
1111
{
|Ψ1〉 ⊗ |Ψe3〉
|Ψ0〉 ⊗ |Ψe7〉
TABLE II: Encoding scheme for gates, using the two-photon, ellip-
tical scheme.
State Fidelity
|Ψ0〉 0.994 ± 0.006
|ΨId〉 0.995 ± 0.002
|Ψnot〉 0.997 ± 0.005
|Ψ1〉 0.998 ± 0.003
|Ψe0〉 0.996 ± 0.002
|Ψe1〉 0.997 ± 0.003
|Ψe2〉 0.992 ± 0.002
|Ψe3〉 0.997 ± 0.002
|Ψe4〉 0.993 ± 0.002
|Ψe5〉 0.997 ± 0.001
|Ψe6〉 0.991 ± 0.007
|Ψe7〉 0.991 ± 0.008
TABLE III: Quantum state fidelity of all used single-qubit states. The
error is estimated using a 500-cycle Monte-Carlo simulation with
Poissonian noise added to the experimental counts.
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